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I. INTRODUCTION 
Judge Kathleen O’Malley of the United States Court of 
Appeals for the Federal Circuit has recently called for 
reconsideration of when a patentee can recover enhanced damages 
from a willful infringer.1 This is in light of two unanimous 
Supreme Court decisions, both issued on April 29, 2014, which 
overturned the Federal Circuit’s handling of attorney fees in patent 
cases.2 These decisions call into question the Federal Circuit’s 
understanding of Supreme Court precedent3 that has been the basis 
for attorney fees and enhanced damages.4 This paper provides 
guidance on how enhanced damages and the entire subject of 
patent remedies (in both law and equity) should be reassessed. 
History shows that that there is an interdependent and intricate 
relationship of law and equity in patent remedies that has been 
missing in most of the current literature. This paper argues that the 
current applications of reasonable royalties, lost profits, enhanced 
damages, injunctions, and ongoing royalties should all be 
reevaluated in light of this history.  
The first part of this article is a brief history of patents and their 
remedies in English law. The second part of this article reviews the 
early patent statutes with a focus on treble damages and their 
relationship with equity. The third part of the article discusses the 
evolution of various remedies prevalent in the 19th century, both at 
law and in equity. Finally, this article reviews reasonable royalties 
and ongoing royalties. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 Halo Elecs., Inc. v. Pulse Elecs., Inc., 769 F.3d 1371, 1385 (Fed. Cir. 2014) 
(O’Malley, J., concurring). 
2 See Octane Fitness, L.L.C., v. Icon Health & Fitness, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 1749, 
1752–53 (2014); Highmark, Inc. v. Allcare Health Mgmt. Sys., Inc., 134 S. Ct. 
1744, 1747–48 (2014). 
3 See Octane Fitness, L.L.C., 134 S. Ct. at 1752–53, 1757 (overturning the 
“objective baselessness” standard for attorney fees); Highmark, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 
at 1747 (holding that an appellate court should review the award of attorney fees 
in patent cases for abuse of discretion). 
4 See Halo Elecs., Inc., 769 F.3d at 1385. 
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II. PATENTS IN EARLY ENGLISH LAW 
English history shows the politics of patents and the distinction 
between law and equity. In the 14th century, England granted 
“Letters Patent” to those who brought new industry to England.5 
These were not monopolies, but rather a license to foreign 
businessmen to come to England and practice their trade.6 It was 
not until the 15th century that the grantees of these patents began 
to use the power of the Crown to develop monopolies.7 Later, these 
monopolies were granted to basic items of commerce.8 From the 
Crown’s perspective, granting these monopolies was an easy way 
to gain favor with patent holders and was also a means to increase 
the Crown’s treasury by way of fees.9 Patentees often used equity 
courts (the English Court of Chancery, which has historically had a 
close relationship to the Crown10) and sometimes coercion to 
enforce their monopolies.11 Because the Letters Patent covered 
basic commodities that the public had no choice but to buy, the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
5 See Ramon A. Klitzke, Historical Background of the English Patent Law, 41 J. 
PAT. OFF. SOC’Y 615, 623 (1959).  
6 Id. at 623 (“The Letters Patent of protection granted . . . at this time were like 
passports which allowed [foreigners] to come to England and practice their 
trade.”); Edward C. Walterscheid, The Early Evolution of the United States 
Patent Law: Antecedents (Part 2), 76 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SOC’Y 849, 
850 (1994). 
7 See 1 R. CARL MOY, MOY’S WALKER ON PATENTS § 1:4 (4th ed. 2013).                                                              
8 Id. 
9 Id. The word “patent” was not used until later. Edward C. Waltershield, The 
Early Evolution of the United States Patent Law: Antecedents (Part 1), 76 J. 
PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SOC’Y 697, 700 (1994). 
10 The Court of Chancery was derived from the King’s Courts. D. M. KERLY, AN 
HISTORICAL SKETCH OF THE EQUITABLE JURISDICTION OF THE COURT OF 
CHANCERY 7–9 (Fred B. Rothman & Co. 1986) (1890). 
11 See 4 DAVID HUME, THE HISTORY OF ENGLAND 345 (1778), available at 
http://oll.libertyfund.org/titles/hume-the-history-of-england-vol-4 (“Such high 
profits naturally begat intruders upon their commerce; and in order to secure 
themselves against encroachments, the patentees were armed with high and 
arbitrary powers from the council, by which they were enabled to oppress the 
people at pleasure, and to exact money from such as they thought proper to 
accuse of interfering with their patent.”). 
4
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prevention of continued infringement by way of an injunction (an 
equitable remedy) to preserve the monopoly was the relief sought. 
Rarely did patentees use common law courts, as these courts 
shared the public’s disdain for the monopolization of basic 
commodities; therefore, patentees could not hope to find relief in 
common law courts.12  
The recognition of social harm placed on the English citizens 
resulted in the passage of the Statute of Monopolies in 1623, which 
voided all patents.13 However, the statute allowed the grant of new 
patents to those who created new inventions.14 Though patents for 
inventions fared better in common law courts than those patents 
that monopolized basic commodities, patents and their 
enforcement by the Court of Chancery were still treated with 
distrust. James I, who sought to limit patents early in his reign15 
(20 years before the Statute of Monopolies was passed16) had 
confided jurisdiction to the courts of common law and excluded 
chancery jurisdiction from determining a patent’s force or 
validity.17 This would delay any equitable relief to patentees until, 
and only if, the validity of the patent was confirmed and legal 
relief was inadequate.18 Though the validity and enforcement of a 
patent resided in courts of law in theory,19 eventually this divide 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
12 MOY, supra note 7, § 1.5; Klitzke, supra note 5, at 645. An excellent example 
is the case of Edward Darcy’s license for making and importing playing cards. 
E. Wyndham Hulme, The History of the Patent System Under the Prerogative 
and at Common Law, 16  L.Q. REV. 44, at 51 (1900) reviewed in Klitzke, supra 
note 5, at 645. Darcy’s decision to bring an infringement action is described as a 
“disastrous mistake” because challenges to the validity of his license were 
prohibited, that is until he brought the case in front of the common law court. 
Klitzke, supra note 5, at 645. 
13 See Statute of Monopolies, 21 Jac. 1, c. 3, § I (1623) (Eng.). 
14 See id. § VI. 
15 MOY, supra note 7, § 1:4. 
16 Klitzke, supra note 5, at 647–48. 
17 See 3 WILLIAM C. ROBINSON, THE LAW OF PATENTS FOR USEFUL INVENTIONS 
§§ 932, 1081 (1890). 
18 Id. § 1081. 
19 Id. 
5
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was eroded when chancellors granted preliminary injunctions to 
accompany the suits at law.20 This was but one example of the 
Court of Chancery resisting any interference of the Crown’s 
prerogative (the grant of patents) from common law courts. 21 
There are important points to be made from this early history 
that contextualize the rest of this paper: First, it was understood 
early on that the value of the patent is the monopoly pricing.22 
Second, there is a social cost to monopoly pricing, which leads to 
resistance of granting equity to patentees.23 Third, the dual system 
of courts of law and courts of equity, and the rivalry between those 
courts, which was influential in early United States politics. 
Finally, notice the theoretical divide between law and equity, and 
the tendency to ignore it. These points are all relevant to 
understanding patent remedies in the United States.  
III. EARLY PATENT REMEDIES 
Modern scholarship treats early patent remedies as an artifact 
not deserving much attention. But if we listen to Judge O’Malley’s 
call to reassess enhanced damages, then the history of early 
statutes should be given more attention. First, a discussion of the 
early U.S. patent statutes with a focus on mandatory treble 
damages and inadequate explanations of its origin from 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
20 Id.  
21 See ROBINSON, supra note 21, § 932 n.3 (citing Wilson v. Tindal, (1841), 1 
Web. P.C. 730 (Eng.) (noting where the judge treated the trial at law as within 
the chancery court). Eventually, Parliament conferred all equity powers to the 
courts of law in patent cases in 1854.  
22 ROBINSON, supra note 17, § 932 (“The redress afforded by an action at law 
consisting simply in an award of damages for past infringements was early 
found to be inadequate for the protection of the patentee.”). It is important to 
note that this article does not assert that a patent and a monopoly are 
synonymous, as doing so is highly controversial. See ALBERT WALKER, 
TREATISE ON LAW AND INVENTIONS § 12 (6th ed. 1929). The assertion is that a 
patentee has exclusive control of pricing, which is not necessarily a monopoly 
“in the old sense of the word.” Id. § 12, p. 17. 
23 Critiques of the monopoly system surfaced in English Parliament as early as 
1571. Klitzke, supra note 5, at 644. 
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contemporary analysis. Second, equity will be discussed, which 
explains the origin of the mandatory treble damages. Third, a 
discussion of the manner in which damages were awarded before 
1836, which would go on to influence the law of patent damages 
for the rest of the 19th century. 
A. Damage Provisions 1790–1800 
Article I, Section 8 of the U.S. Constitution confers to 
Congress the power to grant patents in order to promote the useful 
arts.24 It took just one year for Congress to exercise that power 
with the 1790 Patent Act.25 The 1790 statute allowed the plaintiff 
to recover damages (determined by a jury) and possession of the 
infringing device.26 While this provision might seem to be the 
default award, comparatively it was weak because the copyright 
statute of the same year27 allowed a penalty of fifty cents per 
copied sheet in addition to damages and possession of the copied 
material.28 The lack of a punitive remedy illustrates an overall 
distrust of patents. 
The 1790 Patent Act had several problems and was not 
controlling for long. One issue was that an application for a patent 
had to be approved by a panel consisting of the Secretary of State, 
Secretary of War, and Attorney General.29 Presumably these 
esteemed men had much to do, and the 1793 patent statute released 
these officers of their patent obligations.30 This is the most well 
known change, but not the only one, as the damages provision was 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
24 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. 
25 See 1 Stat. 109 (1790). 
26 Id. § 4. 
27 See generally Copyright Act of 1790, 1 Stat. 124.  
 
28 See 1 Stat. 109 (1790). 
29 Id. § 1. 
30 Patent Act of 1793, 1 Stat. 318 (1793), reprinted in EDWARD C. 
WALTERSCHEID, TO PROMOTE THE PROGRESS OF USEFUL ARTS: AMERICAN 
PATENT LAW AND ADMINISTRATION 1787-1836, at 479 app. VIII (1998). 
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also amended.31 The 1793 act mandated that infringers pay at least 
three times the amount the patentee usually received for either 
selling the patented invention or licensing the invention.32 The 
purpose of this change must be made by inference because there is 
no record of who recommended this change or why it was done.33  
The change in remedies in 1793 is often attributed to Joseph 
Barnes, who published a pamphlet criticizing the 1790 statute and 
the proposed H.R. 166, both of which provided that the damages 
allowed would be determined by juries.34 Barnes distrusted juries, 
whom he felt would refuse to award damages to monopolists.35 
However, these facts only answer why Barnes wanted the change; 
why Congress made the change is still not answered. It is unlikely 
that Congress simply read Barnes’s pamphlet and voted 
accordingly without question. Thomas Jefferson, who held juries in 
high regard,36 would not agree with Barnes’s distrust of juries. Yet, 
it is widely held that Jefferson was influential in the passage of the 
1793 statute.37 Furthermore, patent monopolies were a “bugaboo” 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
31 Patent Act of 1793, 1 Stat. 318 § 5 (1793), reprinted in WALTERSCHEID, supra 
note 30, at 481 app. VII. 
32 Id. 
33 H.R. 121, 1st Cong. (1791) (enacted) reprinted in WALTERSCHEID, supra note 
34, at 109 app. VI; H.R. 166, 1st Cong. (1792). 
34 WALTERSCHEID, supra note 30, at 209–10.  
35 Id. at 109 (citing J. BARNES, TREATISE ON THE JUSTICE, POLICY, AND UTILITY 
OF ESTABLISHING AN EFFECTUAL SYSTEM OF PROMOTING THE PROGRESS OF 
USEFUL ARTS, BY ASSURING PROPERTY IN THE PRODUCTS OF GENIUS, 4-5 
(1972)). 
36 Thomas Jefferson wrote, “I consider trial by jury as the only anchor ever yet 
imagined by man, by which a government can be held to the principles of its 
constitution.” THOMAS JEFFERSON ON POLITICS & GOVERNMENT, 
http://famguardian.org/subjects/politics/thomasjefferson/jeff1520.htm (last 
visited Mar. 1, 2015). 
37 Some, including the Supreme Court, even believe that Thomas Jefferson 
wrote the statute himself, though this belief is likely mistaken. See Edward C. 
Walterscheid, The Use and Abuse of History: The Supreme Court’s 
Interpretation of Thomas Jefferson’s Influence on Patent Law, 39 IDEA 195, 
209–10 (1999); Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303, 308–09 (1980); Graham 
8
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for Jefferson and his Republicans who would have welcomed jury 
interference.38 Unless we are to believe that Congress ignored 
Jefferson’s view of patents but listened attentively to Barnes, 
Barnes cannot be the sole explanation of the treble damages 
provision.39 
Subsequent amendments to the 1793 statute demonstrate that 
juries were not the motivation for the treble damages provision. 
The 1800 amendment to the patent statute provided that an 
infringer should pay “a sum equal to three times the actual damage 
sustained.”40 The jury, then, would determine the actual damage. If 
there was a distrust of juries to handle patent cases, that distrust 
was soon forgotten. Still, the courts were obligated to treble the 
amount found by the jury.41  
It is unlikely that the treble damages provision was instituted 
with juries in mind because the treble provision did not rise and 
fall with the proposed “distrust of juries” sentiment. The more 
likely reason is clear when one recalls the significant division 
between law and equity during that time. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1, 7 (1966); Gen. Talking Pictures Corp. v. W. Elec. 
Co., 305 U.S. 124, 128 n.1 (1938) (Black, J., dissenting). 
38 See WALTERSCHEID, supra note 30, at 430. 
39 It is also unlikely a court decision at that time influenced Congress. See 
WALTERSCHEID, supra note 30, at 157 (citing P.J. Federico, The Patent Trials of 
Oliver Evans, 27 J. PAT. OFF. SOC’Y 586, 603 (1945)). 
40 Patent Act of April 17, 1800, 2 Stat. 37 § 3 (1800) reprinted in WALTERSHIED, 
supra note 30, at 490–91 app. XI). 
41 WILLARD PHILLIPS, THE LAW OF PATENTS FOR INVENTIONS; INCLUDING THE 
REMEDIES AND LEGAL PROCEEDINGS IN RELATION TO PATENT RIGHTS, at 435 




Ryan: A Short History of Patent Remedies
Published by Mitchell Hamline Open Access, 2015
[6:2 2015] CYBARIS®, AN INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 158 
 LAW REVIEW     
 
B. The Early History of Equity in Patent Remedies  
1. The Relationship Between Treble Damages and Equity 
Treble damages were in place in 1793 not to punish the 
infringer but to adequately compensate the patentee because equity 
jurisdiction was almost non-existent at the time. This becomes 
apparent when one considers the history of equity in the United 
States. 
The passage of the Federal Judiciary Act in 1789 created the 
federal courts, but the federal judicial power was still limited to 
only those cases in which the parties were of diverse citizenship.42 
The early patent statutes of 1790 and 1793 allowed federal courts 
jurisdiction only over actions at law.43 Congress deliberately 
excluded equitable jurisdiction in federal courts prior to the 
passage of the 1790 statute.44 Federal courts were therefore limited 
to what remedies they could offer patentees. 
Recalling that the true value of the patent was (and still is) the 
exclusivity of the market that the new invention creates, the 
inability to issue injunctions against patent infringers (save for 
cases of diverse citizenship) was a sharp limitation for federal 
courts in enforcing the patent statute.45 The reason for this 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
42 An Act to Establish the Judicial Courts of the United States, 1 Stat. 73, § 9; 
ROBINSON, supra note 18, § 1083. 
43 Compare Patent Act of 1793, 1 Stat. 318 § 5 (actions on the case are available 
to courts that have competent jurisdiction) with Patent Act of 1800 § 3 (courts 
have original jurisdiction) (emphasis added). Competent jurisdiction, 
apparently, means the persons were of diverse citizenship in the context of 1793. 
ROBINSON, supra note 17, § 1083. 
44 Three weeks before passage of the 1790 act, a bill proposed that a patentee 
could seek remedies by, “action of debt, bill, plaint or information.” Patents Bill, 
H.R. 41, 1st Cong. § 4 (1790) (emphasis added) (reproduced in WALTERSCHEID, 
supra note 30, at 445 app. III). “Bill” would indicate “equity” at the time. 
BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 194 (10th ed. 2014). 
45 See Seymour v. McCormick, 57 U.S. (16 How.) 480, 488 (1853) 
(“[E]xperience began to show that some inventions or discoveries had their chief 
value in a monopoly of use by the inventor, and not in a sale of licenses, the 
10
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limitation is that many feared that courts sitting in equity would 
become as powerful as the English Court of Chancery. Congress 
debated the extent to which equitable remedies were available in 
federal courts during the passage of the Federal Judiciary Act.46 
Jefferson remarked that equity was not to be overused: 
If the legislature means to enact an injustice, 
however palpable, the court of Chancery is not the 
body with whom a correcting power is lodged. That 
it shall not interpose in any case which does not 
come within a general description and admit of 
redress by a general and practicable rule . . .47 
This important issue in early American politics was not limited 
to just patent law. The same Congress that passed the 1793 Patent 
Act also passed the Anti-injunction Act that prevented federal 
courts from meddling with state courts by way of equity.48  
With prospective damages49 and injunctions available only in 
rare circumstances, a patentee would have to continually sue for 
actual damages against infringers to stop continued infringement. 
Therefore, it was necessary that the legal damages be trebled to 
prevent duplicative cases. 
2. Application of Equity in Early American Law 
The nature of intellectual property rights was too tempting for 
judges to refuse equity altogether, to the point that courts may have 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
value of a license could not be made a universal rule, as a measure of 
damages.”). 
46 MOY, supra note 7, § 23:4 (citing Charles Warren, New Light on the History 
of the Federal Judiciary Act of 1789, 37 HARV. L. REV. 49 (1923); Moschzisker, 
Equity Jurisdiction in the Federal Courts, 75 U. PA. L. REV. 287 (1927)); see 
generally An Act to Establish the Judicial Courts of the United States, 1 Stat. 73 
(1789). 
47 Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Phillip Mazzei (Nov. 1785), 
http://founders.archives.gov/documents/Jefferson/01-09-02-0056. 
48 See Anti-Injunction Act, 1 Stat. 333 (1793). 
49 See ROBINSON, supra note 18, § 1089.  
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exercised equity ultra vires.50 The fluidity of equitable jurisdiction 
is apparent in two relevant cases. In Morse v. Reid, a copyright 
case,51 equity was granted in the form of an injunction and 
payment of all the profits made by the defendant.52 The judge 
might have awarded these equitable remedies based on diversity of 
citizenship—the only correct legal ground to do so.53 Even still, 
equity should have been reserved until statutory remedies had been 
applied. Inexplicably, judges ignored the 1790 statute altogether 
before administering equity54 and failed to reserve equitable 
jurisdiction until remedies at law were exhausted. 
In Livingston v. Van Ingen, the proposition that equity applies 
only in cases where damages at law are inadequate was directly 
challenged. After a long discussion of English cases, the court 
wrote:  
An injunction is an appropriate remedy for a 
violation of all statute rights. They are granted of 
course. The numerous cases decided before the 
revolution are conclusive on this point, and binding 
on this court. The remedy is contemporaneous and 
concurrent with the grant itself, and cannot be 
separated from it. The right and the remedy passed 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
50 Ultra Vires is defined as “Unauthorized; beyond the scope of power allowed 
or granted by a corporate charter or by law.” BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1755 
(10th ed. 2014).  
51 The Federal Register mistakenly asserts Morse is a patent case, as well as 
incorrectly stating the caption, date, and relief sought. John D. Gordan III, 
Morse v. Reid: The First Reported Federal Copyright Case, 11 LAW & HIST. 
REV. 21 (1993); see Morse v. Reed, 17 F. Cas. 873 (C.C.D.N.Y. 1796) (No. 
9,860). 
52 See Gordan, supra note 51, at 33. 
53 Root v. Ry. Co., 105 U.S. 189, 192 (1881) (“Of course, in those cases the 
jurisdiction of the court depended on the citizenship of the parties.”). 
54 See Copyright Act of 1790, 1 Stat. 124, §§ 2, 5. 
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to the appellants at the same time. The remedy is a 
part of the grant and cannot be taken away.55 
This case was overruled by North River Steamboat Co. v. 
Livingston over a decade later, but on the grounds that the 
monopoly granted by the State of New York was unconstitutional 
according to the landmark case Gibbons v. Ogden.56 The question 
of when equity is appropriate was not resolved.  
In those instances where federal courts were allowed equity, 
Congress had assumed that the courts would award damages or 
equity according to the tradition of the respective courts.57 As 
Morse and Livingston illustrate, however, the tradition of these 
courts was not agreed upon.58 In context of patent law, it is likely 
that equity was available to only some patentees but not others, and 
the basis for that determination was inconsistent. 
This inconsistency might have led to Congress to allow Federal 
courts equitable jurisdiction in all patent cases in 1819.59 As a 
result of this new jurisdiction, a patentee now had available to him 
or her equitable remedies in federal court. This included 
injunctions and equitable accounting, but courts sitting in equity 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
55 Livingston v. Van Ingen, 9 Johns. 507, 536 (N.Y. 1812), overruled by N. 
River Steamboat Co. v. Livingston, Lock. Rev. Cas. 104, 726 (N.Y. 1825). 
56 N. River Steamboat Co., Lock. Rev. Cas. 104, 726; Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. 
(9 Wheat.) 1 (1824). 
57 See MOY, supra note 7, § 23:4 (citing An Act to establish the Judicial Courts 
of the United States, 1 Stat. 73 (1789)); An Act to Regulate the Processes in the 
Courts of the United States, 1 Stat. 93 (1789). 
58 Compare Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Phillip Mazzei, (Nov. 1785), 
http://founders.archives.gov/documents/Jefferson/01-09-02-0056 (“But this 
court whilst developing and systematising it’s [sic] powers, has found, in the 
jealousy of the nation and it’s [sic] attachment to certain and impartial law, an 
obstacle insuperable beyond that line [that limits the applicability of equity].”) 
with THE FEDERALIST NO. 80 (Alexander Hamilton) (“There is hardly a subject 
of litigation between individuals, which may not involve those ingredients of 
fraud, accident, trust, or hardship, which would render the matter an object of 
equitable rather than of legal jurisdiction.”). 
59 3 Stat. 481, reprinted in WALTERSCHEID, supra note 30, at 491 app. XII. 
13
Ryan: A Short History of Patent Remedies
Published by Mitchell Hamline Open Access, 2015
[6:2 2015] CYBARIS®, AN INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 162 
 LAW REVIEW     
 
could not award damages since that power belonged exclusively to 
courts sitting at law. Though courts sitting in equity could not 
award damages (until 1870),60 the patentee now was able to obtain 
injunctions and a monetary award through accounting. Both 
remedies are discussed in more detail later.61 Briefly, an injunction 
preserves the exclusivity of the market for the plaintiff by 
prohibiting the infringer from using the invention in the future, 
while accounting awards the defendant’s profits “wrongfully 
obtained from use of the plaintiff’s property.”62 Both are powerful 
remedies.  
Why then were the treble damages kept in 1819 if equity was 
now available? Perhaps because these remedies were still 
practically unavailable, as only the jurisdictional obstacle for 
patentees was removed. The difficult procedural rules that 
accompanied bills in equity were still in place,63 leaving these 
remedies difficult to obtain. This led some in Congress in the early 
1820s to attempt to amend the damages provision, for example, by 
making it easier to recover court costs.64 These amendments failed 
because, while some may have still struggled to recover 
compensation, it became apparent that the remedies favored 
patentees too much at the time.65 The difficulties associated with 
obtaining equity would have to wait for several decades.66 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
60 See, e.g., Birdsall v. Coolidge, 93 U.S. 64, 68–69 (1876).  
61 See infra Part IV.B. 
62 Joel Eichengrun, Remedying the Remedy of Accounting, 60 IND. L.J. 463, 463 
(1985). 
63 See DONALD S. CHISUM, 7 CHISUM ON PATENTS § 20.02[1][b] n.20, § 
20.02[1][c] (2014).  
64 See WALTERSCHEID, supra note 30, at 341 (“[Treble damages] did not allow 
him to recover costs in the case, so that, though gaining his cause, the patentee 
might in reality be a loser in the end.” (quoting Representative John Taylor of 
New York)).  
65 See, e.g., Grant v. Raymond, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 218, 230 (1832) (syllabus of the 
court) (“Under the direction of the court he has recovered a verdict for three 
thousand two hundred and sixty-six dollars; and is entitled, of course, to have 
14
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Difficulty in obtaining equity, no matter how necessary to 
compensate patentees, does not mean that the divide between law 
and equity should be ignored.67 The 1819 act did not make legal 
and equitable jurisdiction concurrent, nor did any subsequent 
patent act.68 The divide between law and equity remained,69 as well 
as the long-tested analysis of when to grant equity, such as whether 
the injured party had gained adequate remedies at law.70 The 1836 
patent act preserved this divide. Section 14 of the 1836 act allowed 
“actions on the case” to recover actual damages71 while Section 17 
allowed for suits in equity, “according to the course and principles 
of courts of equity.”72 The point is worth emphasizing, as the 
Supreme Court addressed this issue at length in Root v. Lake Shore 
& M.S. Ry. Co. in 188173 and 125 years later in eBay v. 
MercExchange.74  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
this trebled, and the defendants are ruined. Is this legal? A bill in equity is 
pending also, to stop the defendants' factory.”). 
66 See infra Part IV.B. 
67 This point is particularly important when considering the future of ongoing 
royalties, which is discussed in Part IV.B. 
68 See ROBINSON, supra note 17, § 1084. 
69 Id.  
70 Id. 
71 Patent Act of 1836, 5 Stat. 117 § 14 (1836). 
72 Id. § 17; see CHISUM, supra note 6e, § 20.02[1][d] (“[The 1836 Act] fostered a 
cleavage as to monetary recovery which a patent owner could obtain from an 
infringer . . . ”). Note that Chisum uses the word “foster” rather than “create.” 
73 105 U.S. 189 (1881). After much discussion of the past law, the Court 
concluded, “[i]t does not appear from the allegations of the bill in the present 
case that there are any circumstances which would render an action at law for 
the recovery of damages an inadequate remedy for the wrongs complained of; 
and, as no ground for equitable relief is presented, we are of opinion that the 
Circuit Court did not err in sustaining the demurrer and dismissing the bill.” Id. 
at 216–17. 
74 547 U.S. 388, 394 (2006) (“We hold only that the decision whether to grant or 
deny injunctive relief rests within the equitable discretion of the district courts, 
and that such discretion must be exercised consistent with traditional principles 
of equity, in patent disputes no less than in other cases governed by such 
standards.”). The Court overruled MercExchange v. eBay, 401 F.3d 1323 (Fed. 
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C. Award of Damages in Early Patent Cases 
The absence of equity to most patentees explains the 
mandatory treble provision from 1790 to 1836. The treble 
provision had perhaps an unexpected influence on how damages 
were assessed during that time, and (as the common law system 
often goes) would influence later decisions after the statute was 
amended.  
Take, for example, Justice Joseph Story’s influential 
jurisprudence. In Whittemore v. Cutter, Justice Story rejected any 
argument that a small infringement is no infringement at all: “For 
where the law has given a right, and a remedy for the violation of 
it, such violation of itself imports damage.”75 However, in such 
cases where infringement was minimal, the patentee would receive 
little money for compensation. Story continues, “and in the 
absence of all other evidence, the law presumes a nominal damage 
to the party.”76 Therefore, the patentee was entitled to some sort 
damage if the defendant infringed the patent. The important 
determination is what type of damages should be awarded. 
Justice Story did not hesitate to award mere nominal damages, 
even if the infringement was blatant. Story was adamant that actual 
damages be only what the plaintiff suffered and could prove. In 
Whittemore, Story dismissed the plaintiff’s request that damages 
be the estimated cost for the making of the infringing machine, or 
the price of the machine, reasoning that both are costs suffered 
only by the defendant and would compound the value of the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
Cir. 2005), which held that injunctions are granted in patent cases absent 
exceptional circumstances. 
75 Whittemore v. Cutter, 29 F. Cas. 1123, 1125 (C.C.D. Mass. 1813) (No. 
17,601). However, Justice Story said that mere making for experimental or 
philosophical use is not an infringement, but required the making it for sale, use 
or profit. Making it for use or sale, without actually making a sale or use, is still 
an infringement, but only a nominal damage is awarded. Id.  
76 Id. 
16
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materials and workmanship.77 Therefore, only nominal damages 
(most likely less than a dollar) were awarded in the case. 
Justice Story explained his reasoning as to why nominal 
damages could only be given in those instances that the plaintiff 
was unable to prove his damages. 
By the term “actual damages,” in the statute, are 
meant such damages as the plaintiffs can actually 
prove, and have, in fact, sustained, as 
contradistinguished to mere imaginary or exemplary 
damages, which, in personal torts, are sometimes 
given. The statute is highly penal, and the 
legislature meant to limit the single damages to the 
real injury done, as in other cases of violation of 
personal property, or of incorporeal rights.78 
Therefore, calculation of actual damages needed to be precise 
because the damages would be trebled. The passage continues, (the 
following being used by many courts and commentators that 
damages cannot be speculated or expanded):79  
In mere personal torts, as assaults and batteries, 
defamation of character, etc., the law has, in proper 
cases, allowed the party to recover not merely for 
any actual injury, but for the mental anxiety, the 
public degradation and wounded sensibility, which 
honorable men feel at violations of the sacredness 
of their persons or characters. But the reason of the 
law does not apply to the mere infringement of an 
incorporeal right, such as a patent, and the 
legislature meant to confine the damages to such a 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
77 PHILLIPS, supra note 41, at 439. Whittemore, 29 F. Cas. at 1125. 
78 Whittemore, 29 F. Cas. at 1125 (emphasis added). 
79 See, e.g., ROBINSON, supra note 18, § 1053 n.6. 
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sum that would compensate the party for his actual 
loss.80 
The early reason for treble damages (to adequately compensate 
patentees in lieu of equity) and the effect on patent remedies 
(confining damages to what could be proven) has been almost 
entirely lost in scholarly work. For example, Robinson, a late 19th-
century patent expert, noted, “vindictive damages are not 
permitted, power being conferred upon the court to increase the 
amount fixed by the jury in cases of malicious or persistent 
injury.”81 Robinson errs on this point insofar as he discusses patent 
law before 1836 because trebling the damages was mandatory, no 
matter whether infringement was malicious or unintentional.82  
Without the treble provision, courts might have allowed more 
than just the damages that were proven. Story suggests that he 
might have approached damages differently, and might have 
included “exemplary or imaginary damages” if not for the “highly 
penal” nature of the statute.83 Before his decision in Whittemore, 
he opined, “damages [should] be estimated as high, as they can be, 
consistently with the rule of law on this subject, if the plaintiff’s 
patent has been violated; that wrong doers may not reap the fruits 
of the labor and genius of other men.”84 Justice Story admitted that 
the entire question should be left to the jury, rather than impose 
special rules:  
I rather incline to believe [leaving the jury to 
estimate the actual damages] to be the true course . . 
. The price of machine, the nature, actual state and 
extent of the use of the plaintiff’s invention, and the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
80 Whittemore, 29 F. Cas. at 1125. 
81 ROBINSON, supra note 18, § 1053. 
82 See Seymour v. McCormick, 57 U.S. (16 How.) 480, 488–89 (1853) 
(describing the mandatory treble damages “manifestly unjust”). 
83 See Whittemore, 29 F. Cas. at 1125. 
84 Lowell v. Lewis, 15 F. Cas. 1018, 1018 (C.C.D. Mass. 1817) (No. 8568); 
PHILLIPS, supra note 41, at 440. 
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particular losses to which he may have been 
subjected by the piracy, are all proper ingredients to 
be weighed by the jury in estimating the damages, 
valere quantum valeant.85 
 
This included considering (but not necessarily awarding) the 
profits received by the defendant.86 
However, determining actual damages by the indirect evidence 
of the defendant’s profits was not preferred because of the penal 
nature of the statute. Instead, an established license fee by the 
plaintiff was favored. This was for two reasons. First, the 
computation was easier and therefore more reliable and second, it 
was assumed that the license rate would still compensate the 
patentee because damages would be trebled.87 It can be concluded 
that the emphasis on determining and proving the actual damage 
was out of concern of the highly penal nature of the statute and to 
avoid subjugating unintentional infringers to an overly-harsh 
penalty—the penalty mandated by the statute was enough.88  
Even with the careful calculation of damages and hesitation to 
estimate damages, the law in many minds was too favorable to 
patentees. On a bill that would have made it easier for plaintiffs to 
win attorney fees, Representative Robert Vance of North Carolina 
said the bill would encourage fraudulent patentees to threaten 
litigation, and the user of the invention, “dreading a suit, prefers to 
pay the unjust demand of a mere adventurer.”89 A similar bill that 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
85 Earle v. Sawyer, 8 F. Cas. 254, 258 (C.C.D. Mass. 1825) (No. 4247); 
PHILLIPS, supra note 41, at 443–44. 
86 PHILLIPS, supra note 41, at 444.  
87 Id. at 444–45. 
88 See Seymour v. McCormick, 57 U.S. (16 How.) 480, 488–89 (1853) (stating 
the 1836 Patent Act confined actual damages to limit the court’s power to treble 
the damages). 
89 WALTERSCHEID, supra note 30, at 342 (citing 18 ANNALS OF CONG. 808–09 
(1823)). 
19
Ryan: A Short History of Patent Remedies
Published by Mitchell Hamline Open Access, 2015
[6:2 2015] CYBARIS®, AN INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 168 
 LAW REVIEW     
 
would have awarded court costs was challenged in the House on 
the same grounds.90 A Congressman attempted to compromise 
with repealing the treble damages provision and instead allowed 
costs in all cases.91 The bill was returned to committee to discuss 
repealing the treble damages and instead awarding double costs.92 
The bill was defeated, and despite rampant fraud (there was no real 
examination of applications in the patent system, but mere a 
registration system)93 and predatory litigation, nothing was done 
on the matter until the entire system was revised in 1836.94 
The treble damages provision was amended in 1836. The 
statute provided:  
[T]hat whenever, in any action for damages for 
using or selling the thing whereof the exclusive 
right is secured by any patent heretofore granted, or 
which shall hereafter be granted, a verdict shall be 
rendered to a plaintiff in such action, it shall be in 
the power of the court to render judgment for any 
sum above the amount by such judgment as the 
actual damages sustained by the plaintiff, not 
exceeding three times the amount thereof, according 
to the circumstances of the case.95 
The treble provision was no longer the floor, but the ceiling. In 
such an environment where patent abuse was rampant,96 it was not 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
90 WALTERSCHEID, supra note 30, at 342.  
91 Id. at 343. 
92 Id.; 18 ANNALS OF CONG. 932–37 (1823). 
93 See MOY, supra note 7, § 1:18. 
94 See WALTERSCHEID, supra note 30, at 343–44.  
95 Patent Act of 1836, ch. 357, 5 Stat. 117 § 13, reprinted in WALTERSCHEID, 
supra note 30, at 497 app. XV; see also PHILLIPS, supra note 41, at 435–36. 
96 See, e.g., Evans v. Jordan, 13 U.S. (9 Cranch) 199 (1815) (allowing an 
extension of a patent that had already expired); see also McGaw v. Bryan, 16 F. 
Cas. 96, 102 (S.D.N.Y. 1821) (No. 8793). In McGaw, Judge Van Ness, 
frustrated that he could not void an obviously illegal patent because he was not 
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surprising to see the mandatory nature of the treble damages 
revoked. Still, the treble damages remained, even after equity was 
available, which invites the question as to why it was kept. The 
reason for this is discussed in a subsequent section.97 
To summarize thus far, the first patent act contemplated that 
juries would determine actual damage. In 1793, the damage 
awarded to a patentee was now a mandatory trebling of the price of 
the invention or the license fee to use the invention. The treble 
provision, as such, was added because of the uncertainty 
surrounding a patentee’s access to equity in federal court. In 1800, 
the patent act was amended to mandate trebling of actual damages, 
which in turn meant courts awarded damages according to contract 
principles rather than tort principles.98 In 1836, treble damages 
were no longer mandatory, but within the discretion of the district 
court.99  
D. Analysis of Damages and Equity 1790–1836 
The true value of the patent is the exclusive control over the 
market. With equity only available on an unequal basis (as the 
Morse and Livingston cases illustrate), a patentee must continually 
sue for actual damages against infringers if they hope to stop 
infringement. Mandatory treble damages were necessary in these 
circumstances.100 Even after equity became available in 1819, the 
treble damages provision remained to provide an adequate remedy 
for those patentees who chose to bring actions at law.101 To avoid 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
empowered by the statute, wrote an opinion containing an extraordinary amount 
of sarcasm (the first paragraph is illustrative). Id. 
97 See infra Part IV.A.3. 
98 See Whittemore v. Cutter, 29 F. Cas. 1123, 1125 (C.C.D. Mass. 1813) (No. 
17,601). 
99 How the courts handled this new discretion is discussed in Part IV.A.3. 
100 Sen. John Ruggles, S. Report Accompanying Senate Bill No. 239, at 6 (Apr. 
28, 1836) (explaining that pre-1836 patent law “offer[ed] an inadequate remedy 
for the [infringement] injury, by giving an action of damages.”).  
101 One judge, noting that treble damages are present only at law and not in 
equity, recognized that the reason for the treble damages provision is that law is, 
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over-penalizing infringers, judges required that the patentee to 
prove damages as precisely as possible or be awarded nominal 
damages.  
In 1819, equity jurisdiction was available to patentees in 
federal court. However, the procedural difficulties in obtaining 
equitable remedies remained, which explains why the treble 
damages provision was kept and why some in Congress wished to 
allow plaintiffs to recover costs as part, or in replacement, of 
damage awards. 
IV. THE DEVELOPMENT OF PATENT REMEDIES 
 AFTER 1836 
Determining the precise actual damage to the plaintiff was still 
an emphasis after 1836,102 even after treble damages were no 
longer mandatory. This is because, first, some habits are hard to 
break, and second, damages were still calculated from a contracts 
perspective. Damages were limited to the direct and immediate 
harm to the plaintiff from the date of the infringement to the 
institution of the suit.103 This had a profound influence on patent 
remedies, both at law and equity.  
First, the three available damages at law will be discussed. 
Then, how treble damages were used in conjunction with these 
remedies will be reviewed. Finally, equity during this period will 
be discussed. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
by its nature, inadequate to compensate the patentee. Motte v. Bennett, 17 F. 
Cas. 909, 910 (C.C.D. S.C. 1849) (No. 9884) (“Indeed, if any one thing could 
show more plainly than another, that a trial by a jury in a patent cause was not 
thought the best way to compensate a patentee for an infringement of his patent, 
it is this legislative authority given to the court to give three-fold amount over 
the sum found by the verdict of a jury.”). 
102 See, e.g., Seymour v. McCormick, 57 U.S. (16 How.) 480, 489 (1853). 
103 ROBINSON, supra note 18, § 1053. 
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A. Remedies Available at Law 
1. Established Royalty 
As mentioned before, the preferred measurement of damages 
by a court sitting at law is the established royalty for which the 
patentee had licensed his patent.104 This is the probable reason why 
the 1793 patent act expressly stated that such would be the actual 
damage.105 The form of the license can come in any manner, so 
long as it shows that the owner “has put his own price upon the 
exercise of the right, and offered it to all who are disposed to pay 
the price for its enjoyment.”106 However, the royalty is rarely 
established.107 The Supreme Court laid out five criteria in Rude v. 
Wescott to determine if the patent owner had fixed the value of the 
patent. The royalty must be 1) paid or secured before the 
infringement; 2) paid by such a number of persons as to indicate a 
general acquiescence in its reasonableness; 3) uniform at the place 
where the licenses are issued; 4) not paid under threat of suit or in 
settlement of litigation; and 5) for comparable rights or activity 
under the patent.108 There are numerous defenses that both parties 
could invoke.109  
The infringer could challenge that too few persons had paid a 
royalty before the infringement.110 The royalty must have been 
paid by sufficient persons to demonstrate that the royalty was 
uniform. One expert explains: 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
104 See, e.g., WALKER, supra note 23, §§ 599, 601 (“The primary method [of 
finding damages] consists in using the plaintiff’s established royalty as a the 
measure of those damages.”); CHISUM, supra note 64, § 20.02[2] (citing Clark v. 
Wooster, 119 U.S. 322, 326 (1886) (“It is a general rule in patent causes, that 
established license fees are the best measure of damages that can be used.”)).  
105 Patent Act of 1793, ch. 11, 1 Stat. 318 § 5 (1793), reprinted in 
WALTERSCHEID, supra note 31, at 481 app. VIII. 
106 ROBINSON, supra note 18, § 1056. 
107 CHISUM, supra note 64, § 20.06[2]. 
108 Rude v. Westcott, 130 U.S. 152 (1889). 
109 WALKER, supra note 23, §§ 601–06. 
110 Id. § 601. 
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The unanimous opinion of twelve average men is 
thought to be most reliable criterion of guilt or 
innocence; but no reasonable person [say the same] 
of the opinion of any one of the twelve. In like 
manner, the unanimous acquiescence of a 
considerable number of men in a particular royalty, 
is evidence of substantial justice, while the 
acquiescence of one only of the same men would 
have no convincing force.111 
Additionally, the patentee could not establish a royalty by 
threatening litigation against a large number of persons because 
such practice artificially raised the price.112 The royalty must have 
been actually paid to prevent collusion between patentees and 
licensees against third parties.113 Furthermore, there must have 
been a uniform royalty in the same geographical area.114  
The plaintiff has available many defenses, as well, if he 
thought a royalty would be too low. He, too, could argue that 
established royalties in other geographic areas were inapplicable, 
with the difference being that the defendant was infringing in a 
market that the patentee intended to keep for himself.115 He might 
also argue that the patent had increased in value since the royalty 
was established, and that the patent was valued low because of 
inability to produce or lack of commercial value.116 
Both plaintiff and defendant have several common defenses to 
the established royalty. An important consideration (especially in 
context of reasonable royalties that are given today)117 is that a 
settlement agreement for past infringement “[did] not establish nor 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
111 Id. 
112 Id. 
113 Id. The requirement of actually paid is of evidentiary importance. An oath 
from licensees works for this requirement. See id. 
114 Id. 
115 Id. § 602. 
116 Id. 
117 See infra Part V.A. 
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tend to establish a royalty.”118 The other defenses to be made 
against an established royalty are: a royalty for purchase price of 
the patented invention may be too high or low for use of the 
device,119 a royalty to make and use cannot be used to establish the 
royalty to make and sell,120 and the extent the patented invention is 
used in the other royalties must be factored in.121 These defenses, 
collectively, are all grounds that will, inarguably and absolutely, 
undermine the major premise of using established royalties in the 
first place—that the established royalty was the value that the 
patentee has fixed for all to enjoy. 
It is not difficult to believe, then, that the standard set by Rude 
is rarely met.122 The reason that established royalties are not often 
the measure of damages is not because of Rude or because of the 
numerous defenses, but rather because of the truth and 
persuasiveness of the reasons behind the defenses. If it is important 
that damages be calculated precisely, established royalties should 
not be the measure of damages when the plaintiff has not set the 
value of the patent in that manner. The value of the patented 
invention is its market exclusivity. When a patentee chooses to 
take advantage of the market by making the invention, the value of 
the patent cannot be realized in licenses. Accordingly, licensees do 
not to want to pay a uniform patent rate because each granted 
license has diminishing returns to the licensee as the exclusivity of 
the market share is eroded. Therefore, the established royalty 
rarely exists, not because of a difficult Supreme Court rule or the 
numerous defenses against such a rule, but because the patent’s 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
118 WALKER, supra note 23, § 603 (emphasis added); see Rude v. Westcott, 130 
U.S. 152, 164 (1889).  
119 WALKER, supra note 23, § 604. 
120 Id. § 605. 
121 Id. § 606. 
122 CHISUM, supra note 64, § 20.06[2]; Rude v. Westcott, 130 U.S. 152 (1889). 
The Rude Court remanded the case for nominal damages rather than an 
established royalty. Rude, 130 U.S. at 167. 
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value is most often its exclusive nature, which is not realized in the 
grant of non-exclusive licenses.123 
2. Lost Profits 
Lost profits are the best monetary compensation at law for the 
lost value of the patent due to infringement. Such compensation is 
aimed to remedy the harm to the patentee when the patentee: 
Is able to supply the whole demand for the article it 
covers, and where the whole demand would go to 
him, in the absence of infringement; the losses 
inflicted upon him by an infringer, may consist in 
reducing his sales, or in reducing his prices, or in 
both those injurious ways.124 
In the 19th century, there were several different manners in 
which a defendant could prove lost profits, either directly or 
indirectly.125 A plaintiff could directly show the sales and prices 
before the injury and the resulting effect done by the defendant.126 
In such cases, it did not matter exactly how infringement eroded 
the plaintiff’s profits, only that the harm came by way of the 
infringement.127 Additionally, price erosion, a decrease in demand 
and resulting sale of the product, or harm to reputation of the 
patentee or the patentee products, would all constitute direct 
evidence of lost profits.128 Though defendant’s profits could not be 
considered direct evidence of the plaintiff’s harm, it could be used 
indirectly.129  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
123 In fact, an established royalty would preclude the patentee from claiming lost 
profits. See Yale Lock Co. v. Sargent, 117 U.S. 536, 552 (1885). 
124 WALKER, supra note 23, § 607. 
125 See ROBINSON, supra note 18, §§ 1061–1064. 
126 Id. § 1061. 
127 See id. 
128 Id. 
129 Id. § 1062 (“There is no presumption, either of law or fact, that the plaintiff 
has lost all that the defendant has gained, or that the defendant’s advantage is 
equal to the plaintiff’s loss. But the pecuniary benefit which the defendant has 
26
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However, Seymour v. McCormick130 curbed the use of that 
indirect evidence. Cyrus McCormick invented a reaping machine 
used to harvest wheat.131 Having patented a first version in 1834, 
he sought a new patent in 1845 for relatively small 
improvements.132 The improvements in the latter patent were a seat 
and an improved reel, both of which were relatively inexpensive to 
make.133 The district court judge instructed that the profit for the 
old machine disclosed in the then-expired 1834 patent could be 
recovered, and thus the jury awarded both the profit of the use of 
the old machines and the price of the improvement.134 
Without doubt the trial court instructed the jury incorrectly, as 
the effect of his instructions amounted to a renewal of the 1834 
patent.135 The Court’s dicta, however, is riddled with unfortunate 
errors that would do great harm to the future of patent remedies. 
First, the Court incorrectly stated that the jury could increase 
damages if the infringement was “wanton or malicious” to punish 
the defendant, when that power had only, and ever, resided with 
the Court.136 Pursuant to that, the categorical dismissal of treble 
damages pre-1836 influenced how enhanced damages would be 
applied in the future.137 Second, the Court suggested established 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
derived from the unlawful use of the invention . . . the jury may infer the amount 
by which the plaintiff’s sales and prices have been reduced through the 
infringement.”); see also Philp et. al. v. Nock 84 U.S. (17 Wall.) 460, 462 
(1873). Routinely the jury instructions highlighted the difference. See, e.g., 
McComb v. Brodie, 15 F. Cas. 1290, 1294–95 (C.C.D. La. 1872). 
130 57 U.S. (16 How.) 480 (1853). 
131 Id. at 480.  
132 Id. 
133 Id. at 480–81. 
134 Id. at 481. 
135 Id. at 482. 
136 Id. at 489; see ROBINSON, supra note 18, § 1069 (“[Increasing the damage 
award] is distinctively the province of the court, and confers no authority upon 
the jury, on any ground, to transcend the limits of the actual damages which 
have been established by the evidence.”); Whittemore v. Cutter, 29 F. Cas. 1123, 
1125 (C.C.D. Mass. 1813) (No. 17,601). 
137 See Seymour, 57 U.S. at 488; infra Part IV.A.3. 
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royalties were favorable,138 even though the reasons for favoring 
established royalties were outdated with the passage of the 1836 
statute.139 As a result, lost profits were confined to instances when 
the patent covered a new machine and therefore infringement 
“would destroy the whole value of the monopoly,”140 setting a 
legal standard that must be met before a jury could award lost 
profits. 
Again, the holding in Seymour was not controversial, as it 
cannot be said that small improvements in a train engine would 
entitle “whole profits arising from skill, labor, and capital” of the 
entire railroad industry.141 But the Court, while noting that in some 
instances the jury could award a fraction of the profits based on the 
fraction of the improvement, only allowed this when there was 
evidence for such a fraction.142 Otherwise, a patent for an 
improvement in an old machine was confined to an established 
royalty. 
Seymour’s detrimental effect on lost profits was evident in the 
several cases that involved William Burdell and Augustus 
Denig.143 The case began in 1865 when the plaintiff, Burdell, 
assignee of a patent for a sewing machine, sued Denig and Wiliam 
Lee for damages at law for patent infringement.144 Burdell argued 
for lost profits because the defendants infringed his close 
monopoly in the county of his residence.145 Burdell further proved 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
138 See Seymour, 57 U.S. at 490 (“It is only where, from the peculiar 
circumstances of the case, no other rule can be found, that the defendant's profits 
become the criterion of the plaintiff's loss.”). 
139 See text accompanying notes 85–88 (established royalties preferred because 
of the mandatory treble damages). 
140 Seymour, 57 U.S. at 489. 
141 Id. at 490. 
142 Id.; cf. text accompanying notes 78–81 (damages must be actually proved 
because of the mandatory treble damages).  
143 Burdell v. Denig, 4 F. Cas. 695 (S.D. Ohio 1865) (No. 2142), vacated, 
Burdell v. Denig, 92 U.S. 716 (1875). 
144 Burdell v. Denig, 4 F. Cas. at 697. 
145 Id. 
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that his patent mentioned a particular sewing machine, the Singer 
model, which the defendants had used to make their profits.146 
Burdell’s patent covered a feeding machine to be used with the 
Singer model.147 These facts convinced the jury to award him the 
profits it thought the plaintiff might have gained if not for 
infringement, but the circuit court overturned the jury verdict 
because the Singer sewing machine “had nothing whatever to do” 
with the damages that the plaintiff suffered.148 The Court cited 
Seymour, noting the small improvement in the railroad engine does 
not unfairly entitle the patentee to the “entire amount of profits 
made by the railroad.”149 Thus the effect of Seymour: the jury’s 
conclusion that the patented mechanism was not a mere small 
improvement (akin to the facts in Seymour) but one of a substantial 
nature, was thrown out because the court concluded that the 
defendant’s profits could not be used as indirect evidence of the 
plaintiff’s lost profits. Burdell would plead the same question in 
subsequent proceedings, but to no avail.150 
Seymour’s dicta eroded lost profits, a plaintiff’s most valuable 
remedy in a court of law. Ironically, Seymour’s dicta did not stop 
the nightmare scenario of a patentee gaining entire profits of a 
business for small improvements. It only prevented that nightmare 
scenario in actions at law, not bills of equity.151 
Today, the use of indirect evidence to prove lost profits was 
reinstated with the Panduit case and later Rite-Hite.152 A plaintiff 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
146 Id. 
147 Id.; Burdell v. Denig, 92 U.S. 716, 722 (1875). 
148 Burdell, 4 F. Cas. at 698. 
149 Id. at 699. 
150 Burdell v. Denig, 92 U.S. at 722. 
151 Westinghouse Elec. & Mfg. Co. v. Wagner Elec. & Mfg. Co., 225 U.S. 604, 
620 (1912) (“On established principles of equity, and on the plainest principles 
of justice, the guilty trustee cannot take advantage of his own wrong. The fact 
that he may lose something of his own is a misfortune which he has brought 
upon himself . . . .”). 
152 Rite-Hite Corp. v. Kelley Co., 56 F.3d 1538 (Fed. Cir. 1995); Panduit Corp. 
v. Stahlin Bros. Fibre Works, Inc, 575 F.2d 1152, 1156 (6th Cir. 1978). 
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must prove that all the infringing sales would have been made by 
the plaintiff if not for infringement, quantify the profits displaced, 
and demonstrate that the plaintiff was able to make those sales.153 
Though it may now be proved indirectly, such indirect evidence is 
controversial.154 Additionally, lost profits are sometimes 
considered in calculation of a reasonable royalty, which is also 
controversial.155 It is this indeterminate calculation that is at the 
heart of the controversy, both past and present. 
3. Application of Treble Damages after 1836 
When discussing treble damages, this article has thus far 
focused on the mandatory nature of damages from 1793 to 1836.156 
To reiterate, the treble damages were placed so as to ensure 
adequate compensation to patentees,157 many of whom did not 
have access to equity.158 The 1836 statute no longer mandated 
treble provisions,159 as patentees had more than enough access to 
remedies after the 1819 act allowed patentees access to equitable 
remedies in federal court regardless of the citizenship of the 
parties.160 The statutory language, which remains fundamentally 
the same today, gives district courts sole discretion to enhance 
damages.161 The application of enhanced damages after 1836 will 
be the focus of this section. 
Courts were quick to limit enhanced damages to particular 
facts that focused on the infringer’s conduct. This was a natural 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
153 Panduit, 575 F.2d at 1156. 
154 See Amy L. Landers, Liquid Patents, 84 DENV. U. L. REV. 199, 256 (2006). 
155 See Mark A. Lemley, Distinguishing Lost Profits from Reasonable Royalties, 
51 WM. & MARY L. REV. 655, 667–68 (2009). 
156 Supra Part III.A, B.1. 
157 See supra note 106. 
158 Supra Part III.B.1. 
159 Patent Act of 1836, 5 Stat. 117 § 14, reprinted in WALTERSCHEID,  supra note 
note 31, at 505 app. XV. 
160 Patent Act of 1819 Act, 3 Stat. 481, reprinted in WALTERSCHEID, supra note 
note 35, at 491 app. XII.  
161 See 35 U.S.C. § 284 (2012). 
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reaction to the principle critique of mandatory treble damages—
that it was unjust to penalize an “innocent” infringer.162 Courts, 
however, struggled to determine which particular facts warrant 
enhanced damages.  
One court contemplated that many conditions must be met: that 
the invention had to be valuable, the infringement wanton, the 
litigation expensive, and the verdict wholly inadequate.163 Some 
judges required that only the infringement be wanton.164 These 
courts err to the extent that these cases interpreted Seymour v. 
McCormick as requiring willful or wanton infringement rather than 
the four-element test.165 The passage often cited states:  
Experience had shown the very great injustice of a 
horizontal rule equally affecting all cases, without 
regard to their peculiar merits. The defendant, who 
acted in ignorance or good faith, claiming under a 
junior patent, was made liable to the same penalty 
with the wanton and malicious pirate. This rule was 
manifestly unjust. For there is no good reason why 
taking a man's property in an invention should be 
trebly punished, while the measure of damages as to 
other property is single and actual damages.166  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
162 Seymour v. McCormick, 57 U.S. (16 How.) 480, 488 (1853) (“Experience 
had shown the very great injustice of a horizontal rule equally affecting all cases 
without regard to their particular merits.”). 
163 Schwarzel v. Holenshade, 21 F. Cas. 772, 773 (D.C.S.D. Ohio 1866) (No. 
12,506). 
164 See Brodie v. Ophir Silver Min. Co., 4 F. Cas. 202, 204 (C.C.D. Cal. 1867) 
(No. 1919) (citing Seymour, 57 U.S. at 488).  
165 See, e.g., In re Seagate, 497 F.3d 1360, 1368 (Fed. Cir. 2007). In re Seagate 
also cited a Supreme Court case which asserted that the treble damages 
provision was linked to willful infringement, but that assertion was mere dicta 
and did not cite any support. See Aro Mfg. Co. v. Convertible Top Replacement 
Co., 377 U.S. 476, 508 (1964). 
166 Seymour, 57 U.S. at 488–89. 
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This passage says nothing of infringers squarely in the middle of 
innocent infringers and wanton pirates. The Supreme Court 
addressed this question in later cases and did not limit the power of 
the district courts to use their discretion. In Clark v. Wooster 
(1886), the Court suggested that enhanced damages could be used 
for compensatory purposes.167 Again, in Topliff v. Topliff, the 
Court seemed to suggest it would not disagree with the district 
court, one way or another, in the district court’s use of enhanced 
damages.168 
Indeed, in the 19th century there were at least two such cases 
that made considerations other than willfulness of the infringer. In 
Russell v. Place, the court thought it was proper to enhance 
damages if the jury did not compensate the plaintiff enough against 
any willful infringer.169 The court suggested that willful infringers 
are not limited to “wanton or malicious pirate[s]”,170 but those who 
made an “erroneous estimate of the plaintiff’s rights.”171  In Peek 
v. Frame, the court considered price erosion and the approximated 
lost profits in a decision to increase damages.172 
Willfulness became an important consideration only when 
district courts balanced the behavior of the parties. A patentee who 
did not practice his invention was not allowed enhanced 
damages.173 Good faith was enough to avoid enhanced damages, 
and in one case lowered the singular damage proven by the 
plaintiff.174 These considerations are indicative of law on damages 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
167 Clark v. Wooster, 119 U.S. (16 How.) 322, 326 (1886) (“There may be 
damages beyond this . . . but these are more properly the subjects of allowance 
by the court under the authority given to it to increase damages.”); CHISUM, 
supra note 64, § 20.03[4][b][ii]. 
168 See 145 U.S. 156, 174 (1892); CHISUM, supra note 64, § 20.03[4][b][ii]. 
169 21 F. Cas. 57, 58 (C.C.N.D.N.Y. 1871) (No. 12,161); see also ROBINSON, 
supra note 21, §1069 n. 3. 
170 See Seymour, 57 U.S. at 489. 
171 Russell, 21 F. Cas. at 58. 
172 19 F. Cas. 97, 98 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1871) (No. 10,903). 
173 ROBINSON, supra note 23, § 1069. 
174 Hogg v. Emerson, 52 U.S. (11 How.) 587, 607 (1850). 
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in general. As one judge recognized, when charging the jury to 
determine damages: 
[T]he question of damages being one of 
compensation, of which it is always, in such cases, 
difficult to fix a standard, much must depend upon 
the discretion of the jury, who may sometimes 
properly take the conduct and motives of a 
defendant into consideration.175  
Just as the jury might take into account the parties’ behavior, 
judges will do the same when charged with a power to increase 
damages.  
There are two problems, however, with balancing party 
equities, both made apparent by the current state of the law today. 
First, the original purpose of the treble provision, which was to 
provide adequate remedy for those who try their case at law rather 
than equity, is lost when behavior is the sole criteria.176 As of this 
publication, courts may no longer use enhanced damages to better 
compensate patentees,177 and therefore must rely on equity in some 
way to be fully compensated. Willful infringement is required even 
though it has never been a statutory requirement for enhanced 
damages.178  
The second problem is that the Court of Appeals for the 
Federal Circuit, which has appellate jurisdiction over all patent 
cases,179 has struggled to create standards that allow district courts 
to apply enhanced damages consistently. In re Seagate articulates 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
175 Parker v. Hulme, 18 F. Cas. 1138, 1144 (C.C.E.D. Pa. 1849) (No. 10,740). 
176 See In re Seagate Tech., 497 F.3d 1360, 1378–80 (Fed. Cir. 2007) (Gajarsa, 
J., concurring) (describing when a district court might use enhanced damages for 
remedial purposes). 
177 Jurgens v. CBK, Ltd., 80 F.3d 1566, 1570 (Fed. Cir. 1996).  
178 See Seagate, 497 F.3d at 1377 (Gajarsa, J., concurring). 
179 28 U.S.C. § 1295(a)(4)(A) (2012). 
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the current standard, which is “objective recklessness.”180 This 
standard brings with it a certain consistency (in a way) but has 
effectively discouraged the exercise of the court’s discretion in 
awarding enhanced damages. The Federal Circuit was persuaded 
by Supreme Court precedent unrelated to patent law,181 without 
accounting for the history of the patent statute.182 
The current test for enhanced damages cannot be correct when 
one considers how attorney fees are awarded. Attorney fees in 
patent suits may be granted in “exceptional cases,” language that is 
not present in the damages provision.183 Despite the differences in 
language, the Federal Circuit has required essentially the same 
test.184 However, two Supreme Court decisions in 2014 have made 
it easier to win attorney fees.185 If “objective recklessness” is a 
harsh standard for attorney fees, then it is a necessary conclusion 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
180 See Seagate, 497 F.3d at 1371 (opinion of the court) (raising the threshold for 
enhanced damages from what was “akin to negligence” to a heightened 
“objective recklessness” standard).  
181 Id. at 1370 (citing Safeco Ins. Co. of Am. v. Burr, 551 U.S. 47 (2007) 
(interpreting the Fair Credit Reporting Act)). 
182 Id. at 1377–78 (Gajarsa, J., concurring) (recounting the history of the treble 
damages provision and noting that “actual damages provable at law—though not 
‘inadequate’ in the equitable sense—could nevertheless be less than sufficient to 
compensate the patentee. In such a case, a discretionary enhancement of 
damages would be appropriate for entirely remedial reasons, irrespective of the 
defendant's state of mind.”); WALKER, supra note 23, § 613 (“Increased 
damages may properly be awarded by a Court, where it necessary . . . to prevent 
a defendant infringer from profiting from his own wrong, whether that wrong 
was intentional or was unwitting.”). 
183 35 U.S.C. § 285 (2012) (attorney fees); cf. id. § 284 (damages). 
184 See iLOR, LLC. v. Google, Inc., 631 F.3d 1372, 1376–77 (Fed. Cir. 2011) 
(noting that the objective recklessness standard applied for both § 284 and § 
285, once again only allowing an award of attorney fees “when there has been 
some material inappropriate conduct related to the matter in litigation”). 
185 Octane Fitness, LLC v. Icon Health & Fitness, 134 S. Ct. 1749, 1758 (2014) 
(objective recklessness standard rejected as it “would appear to render § 285 
largely superfluous”); Highmark, Inc. v. Allcare Health Mgmt. Sys., Inc., 134 S. 
Ct. 1744, 1749 (2014) (award of attorney fees should be reviewed for abuse of 
discretion). Both of these decisions were issued on April 29, 2014. See Octane 
Fitness, 134 S. Ct. 1749; Highmark, 134 S. Ct. 1744.  
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that it is too harsh a standard for enhanced damages. It is on this 
matter that Judge O’Malley of the Federal Circuit has called for 
reconsideration of the standard for enhanced damages in light of 
recent Supreme Court decisions.186 
B. Equity in Patent Law 
There were two forms of equitable remedies available to 
patentees in the 19th century: injunction and accounting of profits. 
The substantive187 and procedural188 rules of equitable remedies 
are not from any statute, patent or otherwise. Rather, they hail from 
the traditions of the English Court of Chancery, which were 
incorporated in the United States by way of the Federal Judiciary 
Act of 1789.189 These procedural rules were largely discarded with 
the merger of law and equity in the 1938 Federal Rules of Civil 
Procedure,190 but the substantive rules have remained unaffected 
by a recent reorganization of the Judiciary Act.191 This section will 
first discuss the history and application of injunctions, followed by 
the grant of profits by equitable accounting. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
186 Halo Elecs., Inc. v. Pulse Elecs., Inc., 769 F.3d 1371,1384–85 (Fed. Cir. 
2014). 
187 Robinson v. Campbell, 16 U.S. (3 Wheat.) 212, 221–22 (1818) (substantive 
equitable rules inherited from England). 
188 Hayburn’s Case, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 409, 413-14 (1792) (“The Court considers 
the practice of the Courts of King's Bench and Chancery in England as affording 
outlines for the practice of this Court, and that it will from time to time make 
such alterations therein as circumstances may render necessary.”), available at 
https://supreme.justia.com/cases/federal/us/2/409/case.html. 
189 H. Tomás Gómez-Arostegui, Prospective Compensation in Lieu of a Final 
Injunction in Patent and Copyright Cases, 78 FORDHAM L. REV. 1661, 1691 
(2010). 
190 Id. at 1692; Stainback v. Mo Hock Ke Lok Po, 336 U.S. 368, 382 n.26 (1949) 
(“Notwithstanding the fusion of law and equity by the Rules of Civil Procedure, 
the substantive principles of Courts of Chancery remain unaffected.”). 
191 See Gómez-Arostegui, supra note 194, at 1692. 
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1. Injunctions 
A patentee’s best remedy for infringement is an injunction, as 
this preserves market exclusivity.192 Conceptually, instituting 
preliminary injunctions is very different than permanent 
injunctions because the preliminary injunction is granted without 
full knowledge of the merits of the controversy, whereas the 
permanent injunction is meant to stop activity that is decidedly 
illegal.193 However, the evolution of preliminary and permanent 
injunctions has been identical, albeit not contemporaneous. 
The English practice of instituting a preliminary injunction to 
accompany the suit at law194 was inherited in kind by the United 
States.195 In the early 19th century, the preliminary injunction was 
granted on the same conditions as in England—that is, if the 
patentee signed an affidavit196 and there were no “glaring defects” 
to the patent.197 The only apparent difference between the 
applications of these injunctions was the frequency of the 
applications filed by patentees.198 Phillips, in his 1830 treatise on 
patent law, theorized that patentees were satisfied with remedies at 
law (apparently impressed with the treble damages provision),199 
but one contemporary treatise points out that equity was not readily 
available.200 The latter should be more convincing, considering that 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
192 ROBINSON, supra note 23, § 1168 (“The exercise of its preventive jurisdiction 
. . . is the most potent and most valuable of all methods provided by the law for 
the protection of the owner of a patent.”). 
193 Id. § 1169. 
194 See supra text accompanying note 26. 
195 PHILLIPS, supra note 42, at 453–54 (citing, as examples, Justice 
Washington’s opinions in Ogle v. Ege, 18 F. Cas. 619 (C.C.D. Pa.1826) (No. 
10,462), Isaacs v. Cooper, 13 F. Cas. 153 (C.C.D. Pa. 1821) (No. 7,096)). 
196 PHILLIPS, supra note 42, at 454. 
197 Isaacs, 13 F. Cas. At 154. As to defects to the patent, the older the patent, the 
more it was presumed valid. See Sullivan v. Redfield, 23 F. Cas. 357 
(C.C.D.N.Y. 1825) (No. 13,597). 
198 PHILLIPS, supra note 42, at 454. 
199 Id.; see Patent Act of 1800, 2 Stat. 37, § 3, reprinted in WALTERSCHEID, 
supra note 35, at 489 app. XI. 
200 CHISUM, supra note 67, § 20.04[1][a][i]. 
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the “most potent” remedy for a patentee is an injunction201 and that 
damage awards were often never proved.202 
As preliminary injunctions became more accessible after 
1819,203 the requirements to obtain them became more stringent. 
Validity of the patent was no longer the sole consideration.204 A 
preliminary injunction was granted only after considering the 
traditional considerations of the balance of harms to the plaintiff,205 
the behavior of the parties,206 and the public interest.207 In one 
case, there was no harm to a plaintiff’s exclusive market because 
the invention was only for a small improvement.208 In Bliss v. City 
of Brooklyn, an injunction was denied because the invention was 
necessary for public use in case of fires; this was despite certainty 
of validity and infringement.209 Still, Robinson in his 1890 treatise 
found the principal question to be the validity of the patent when 
granting injunctions: 
Though it may work hardship to the defendant or 
other parties, and though the defendant offers such 
security against future losses as the plaintiff may 
require it, the infringement will not be permitted to 
continue to the manifest and injurious violation of 
the patent . . . . [The other considerations] may avail 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
201 See ROBINSON, supra note 23, §1168. 
202 See supra Part III.A. 
203 Patent Act of 1819, 3 Stat. 481, reprinted in WALTERSCHEID, supra note 35, 
at 491 app. XII. 
204 Although, it is still a prominent consideration. As an illustrative example, 
Robinson’s treatise spends seventeen sections discussing the different types of 
evidence that would show a patent valid. See ROBINSON supra note 21, § 1173–
90. 
205 Id. § 1193.  
206 Id. § 1194–97 (preliminary injunctions not granted in cases of estoppel, 
laches, improper purpose, or the defendant’s good faith). 
207 Id. § 1200. 
208 Batten v. Silliman, 2 F. Cas. 1028, 1030 (C.C.E.D. Pa. 1855) (No. 1106). 
209 Bliss v. City of Brooklyn, 3 F. Cas. 706, 707 (C.C.E.D.N.Y. 1871) (No. 
1544). 
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the [defendant] where principal questions are in 
doubt . . . but where the plaintiff’s case is clear, and 
his injury imminent, the court will never hesitate to 
grant the desired relief.210 
Yet, before this soliloquy, Robinson acknowledges the importance 
of other equitable considerations.211 Preliminary injunctions in all 
areas of the law, generally, have been granted inconsistently.212 
But this is a necessary evil, because preliminary injunctions are of 
such importance that certainty on the merits is not the only 
consideration. The interests of justice and fairness are also 
considered, and therefore should be within the discretion of the 
district court when considering equitable remedies.213 
The evolution of permanent injunctions to consider “outside” 
factors in patent remedies mirrors that of preliminary injunctions, 
but at a substantially slower rate. As courts slowed the pace of 
granting preliminary injunctions out of caution,214 there was no 
reason for hesitation in the case of permanent injunctions. When a 
patentee petitioned the court for a permanent injunction, validity 
and infringement were already established. It was presumed that 
injunctions should be granted as a matter of course.215 Other than 
inequitable conduct or perhaps a substantial social harm, no 
equitable principles were weighed against granting the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
210 ROBINSON, supra note 18, § 1201 (internal citations omitted). 
211 See id. 
212 See generally John Leubsdorf, The Standard for Preliminary Injunctions, 91 
HARV. L. REV. 525 (1978). 
213 See Rice & Adams Corp v. Lathrop, 278 U.S. 509, 514 (1929) (the district 
court decision to grant or deny the injunction was in its discretion); Mayview 
Corp. v. Rodstein, 480 F.2d 714, 715 (9th Cir. 1973) (“[O]nce validity is 
established . . . and infringement shown, general equitable principles apply to 
the remaining prerequisites to an injunction.”). 
214 See CHISUM, supra note 64, § 20.04[1][a][iii] (contemporary rule is that 
preliminary injunctions should only be issued on strong evidence of both 
validity and infringement). 
215 ROBINSON, supra note 18, § 1170.  
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injunction.216 Whether these injunctions were granted with no 
consideration made of the remedy available at law,217 or granted 
because monetary remedies were inherently inadequate,218 it was 
clear that district courts almost always granted the patentee a 
permanent injunction.219 In 2006, the Supreme Court unanimously 
held that traditional equitable principles should be considered 
when granting an injunction,220 thus the substantive rules for 
granting permanent injunctions are now substantially the same as 
for preliminary injunctions.221 
2. Accounting 
Accounting is an equitable remedy in which the defendant pays 
the plaintiff for profits that the defendant had unlawfully 
acquired.222 The remedy is available when the defendant had legal 
rights of something that should have belonged to the plaintiff,223 
and therefore the defendant is made to pay whatever gains it made 
through use of the plaintiff’s property back to the plaintiff. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
216 Gómez-Arostegui, supra note 189, at 1665–66.  
217 See Livingston v. Van Ingen, 9 Johns. 507, 536 (N.Y. 1812) (No. 8420) 
overruled on unrelated grounds by N. River Steamboat Co. v. Livingston, 1825 
WL 1859 (N.Y. 1825) (“An injunction is an appropriate remedy for a violation 
of all statute rights. They are granted of course.”); ROBINSON, supra note 17, § 
1220 (“[Injunctions are] granted irrespective of his right to profits or damages or 
any other form of relief . . . .”); Gómez-Arostegui, supra note 190, at 1665. 
218 See eBay v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 547 U.S. 388, 395 (2006) (Roberts, C.J., 
concurring) (“From at least the early 19th century, courts have granted 
injunctive relief upon a finding of infringement in the vast majority of patent 
cases. This ‘long tradition of equity practice’ is not surprising, given the 
difficulty of protecting a right to exclude through monetary remedies that allow 
an infringer to use an invention against the patentee's wishes—a difficulty that 
often implicates the first two factors of the traditional four-factor test.”); see also 
DAN B. DOBBS, 1 LAW OF REMEDIES 58 (2d ed. 1993) (asserting that legal rights 
have traditionally taken into account remedies available at law). 
219 Gómez-Arostegui, supra note 190, at 1665. 
220 eBay, 547 U.S. at 391 (opinion of the Court). 
221 See Gómez-Arostegui, supra note 190, at 1665. 
222 See DOBBS, supra note 219, at 588. 
223 Id. at 587. 
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Accounting is, essentially, a disgorgement of the defendant’s 
profits. 
Before accounting was precluded by a statute change in 1948, 
it was the most potent remedy for monetary awards, either in law 
or in equity. The remedy became unacceptable in patent law as it 
became procedurally untenable. 
For example, a farmer harvests crops with a machine, but the 
machine was invented and patented by another. The farmer used 
this machine without permission of the inventor, and therefore 
infringed.224 Although the farmer, who read about the patent and 
made the machine based on that knowledge, has legal title to the 
machine itself, the concept of the machine belongs to the inventor. 
Therefore, the title to the machine should have belonged to the 
inventor, and the farmer used the invention in a “constructive 
trust.”225 The profits or income from use of the machine therefore 
belong to the inventor.226 Unlike lost profits, the inventor is 
entitled to the profits even if he could not possibly exploit the 
market himself.227 
The Patent Act of 1819 conferred jurisdiction to federal courts 
sitting in equity to exercise the remedy of accounting in all patent 
cases.228 There were three obstacles the plaintiff had to overcome 
to receive an accounting. First, because courts of equity did not 
traditionally decide questions of fact, accounting required complex 
procedural maneuvers.229 The equity court sometimes acted as a 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
224 See 35 U.S.C. § 271(a) (use of a patented machine constitutes infringement). 
225 See DOBBS, supra note 218, at 587. 
226 Id. at 588. 
227 ROBINSON, supra note 18, § 1136 (“[Accounting includes] all the benefits 
which the defendant has derived from the invention, without reference to the 
amount which the plaintiff might otherwise have received.”). 
228 Patent Act of 1819, 3 Stat. 481, reprinted in WALTERSCHEID, supra note 30, 
at 491 app. XII. 
229 See, e.g., Van Hook v. Pendleton, 28 F. Cas. 998, 999–1000 (C.C.S.D. N.Y. 
1848) (discussing the equitable rules in creating a factual record). 
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court of law and paneled a jury,230 or it would require the plaintiff 
to file a complaint in law as well as equity.231 The second obstacle 
was that, in situations where the infringer made no profits from the 
infringement, the patentee had no remedy available.232 Finally, a 
bill for accounting required the patentee to file for an injunction as 
well,233 because the infringer was not literally a trustee.234 If an 
injunction was not available, say, because the patent had 
expired,235 then equitable accounting was closed off to the 
patentee—otherwise plaintiffs needed only make a general prayer 
of relief in equity.236  
These limitations, however, were minor compared to the 
requirements to receive damages at law237 for two reasons: first, 
the obstacles to equitable remedies were applied inconsistently;238 
second, the complex procedural maneuvers were substantially 
reduced in the 1875 patent act when courts in equity were 
expressly empowered to empanel a jury in patent cases,239 and they 
were fully relieved when law and equity merged in 1938.240 
Additionally, the 1870 patent act allowed a patentee to recover 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
230 This is the “feigned issue.” See CHISUM, supra note 63, § 20.02[1][c]. 
231 Id. 
232 City of Elizabeth v. Am. Nicholson Pavement Co., 97 U.S. 126, 139 (1877) 
(“[T]hough the defendant's general business be ever so profitable, if the use of 
the invention has not contributed to the profits, none can be recovered.”). 
233 Root v. Lake Shore & M.S. Ry. Co., 105 U.S. 189, 194, 215–216 (1881). 
234 Id. at 214. 
235 See, e.g., Parks v. Booth, 102 U.S. 96, 107 (1880) (denying injunction 
because patent had expired). 
236 Stevens v. Gladding, 58 U.S. (17 How.) 447, 453 (1854). 
237 For the difficulties of winning an award for legal damage, see supra Part 
III.A. 
238 The Root opinion presents indirect evidence that the case law was 
inconsistent. See Root, 105 U.S. at 191 (“An examination of the practice and 
opinions of the Circuit Courts undoubtedly shows much diversity, incapable of 
reconciliation . . . .”).  
239 Act of Feb. 16, 1875, ch. 77, § 2, 18 Stat. 315, 316. 
240 See Ross v. Bernhard, 396 U.S. 531, 539–540 (1970) (“Purely procedural 
impediments to the presentation of any issue by any party, based on the 
difference between law and equity, was destroyed.”). 
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legal damages (royalties or lost profits) if equitable accounting 
proved insufficient.241 Finally, the requirement that an accounting 
action be accompanied by an infringement action was relaxed.242 
Still, there were several problems with accounting. The process 
was—and still is—excruciatingly slow,243 taking years to 
determine damages.244 Depending on which party could benefit 
from dragging out the proceeding, a plaintiff or defendant could 
use the delay as leverage for a settlement.245 There were substantial 
questions of proof and apportionment. Courts struggled to 
determine who had the burden of proof, and how to correctly 
apportion the profits.246 Such problems occurred because the 
infringer was not, in the tradition of accounting, a trustee for an 
account, and therefore accounting was an imperfect test for patent 
remedies.247 Collectively, these problems too often resulted in a 
“denial of justice because of delay of justice.”248 
Courts today interpret the passage of the 1946 act as 
disallowing accounting procedures, and therefore, a plaintiff 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
241 Act of July 8, 1870, Ch. 230, § 55, 16 Stat. 198, 206 (1870); Birdsall v. 
Coolidge, 93 U.S. 64, 69 (1876) (“Gains and profits are still the proper measure 
of damages in equity suits, except in cases where the injury sustained by the 
infringement is plainly greater . . . .”). Note, however, that the inverse was not 
true—an action of law could not recover the infringer’s profits by way of 
accounting. E.g., Coupe v. Royer, 155 U.S. 565, 582 (1895).  
242  See Clark v. Wooster, 119 U.S. 322, 323–25 (1886) (noting equity 
jurisdiction established though the patent expired just 15 days before the 
complaint was filed); CHISUM, supra note 63, § 20.02[1][e]. 
243 Eichengrun, supra note 63, at 471. 
244 See Vincent P. Tassinari, Compiled Legislative History of 35 U.S.C. § 284: 
The Patent Compensation Statute, 31 UWLA L. REV. 45, 70 (2000). 
245 See id. at 69-70 (discussing testimony reporting to Congress a case that took 
twenty years for awards to be granted). Notice that the “delay of justice” does 
not indicate it favors plaintiffs or defendants. Id. at 70. 
246 See generally CHISUM, supra note 64, § 20.02[3] (describing the “intricacies” 
of determining the account). 
247 Cf. Eichengrun, supra note 63, at 477–81 (offering clarity on the burden of 
proof in traditional accounting when the defendant is a trustee). 
248 Tassinari, supra note 245, at 70. 
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cannot recover the profits made by the infringers by accounting.249 
However, whether this was Congress’s intent is debatable: 
Congress may have simply put it in the Court’s power to award the 
infringer’s profits immediately with a reasonable royalty.250 It was 
the Supreme Court in Aro Manufacturing Co. v. Convertible Top 
Replacement Co., (1964)251 that eliminated the use of 
accounting.252 However, this particular holding should carry little 
precedential value. The issue of damages was not before the Court, 
and the part of the opinion discussing accounting was not part of 
the majority opinion.253 Yet, even if Aro is unpersuasive, lower 
courts are likely to avoid accounting when other remedies are 
available because the accounting would still substantially delay 
justice. 
C. Analysis of Damages and Equity after 1836 
Prior to 1836, legal damages were automatically trebled so as 
to provide adequate compensation because equity was largely 
unavailable. Courts found it necessary to calculate the damages 
award precisely because any mistake in the calculation would be 
trebled. The assumption was that the treble provision was enough 
to provide adequate compensation without the need to estimate 
damages.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
249 Eric E. Bensen, Apportionment of Lost Profits in Contemporary Patent 
Damages Cases, 10 VA. J. L. & TECH. 8, 27 (2005). 
250 Georgia-Pacific Corp. v. United States Plywood Corp., 243 F. Supp. 500, 
521–22 (S.D.N.Y. 1965); see also, Tassinari, supra note 245, at 81 (“Although 
the bill would not preclude the recovery of profits as an element of general 
damages, yet by making it unnecessary to have proceedings before masters and 
empowering equity courts to assess general damages irrespective of profits, the 
measure represents proposed legislation which in the judgment of the committee 
is long overdue.”). Notice that the report fails to distinguish recovery of lost 
profits from the infringer’s profits. 
251 377 U.S. 476, 506-07 (1964) (plurality opinion). 
252 Benson, supra note 250, at 28. 
253 Id. 
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However, if damages could not be proved by either an 
established royalty or lost profits, then the plaintiff could only 
recover nominal damages. Royalties were rarely established 
because royalties did not realize a patent’s true value. Lost profits 
were unavailable to most patentees unless they created and 
fostered a new market with their invention. As a result, nominal 
damages were the singular damages, and trebled nominal damages 
were still nominal. 
The Patent Act of 1836 amended the treble provision from a 
mandatory calculation to place it within the discretion of the court. 
Rather than allowing damages to be estimated by the jury, it still 
required that the singular damages be calculated precisely as 
before. The lack of compensation at law for many patentees 
continued after 1836—that is until the advent of the reasonable 
royalty, discussed in the section below. 
While patentees at law were undercompensated, they could 
find more fertile ground in courts of equity. For established 
patents, preliminary injunctions were increasingly granted, which 
placed the patentee in an excellent position for settlement 
negotiation. Likewise, permanent injunctions were granted as a 
matter of course. Because equity did not demand the sort of 
precision in calculation of damages, patentees could even recover 
substantial monetary damages by way of accounting, such as the 
entire profit made by the infringer for use of the product. In stark 
contrast with Seymour, a patentee could recover the profits of a 
defendant even if the defendant’s infringement constituted a small 
improvement for a machine or product. As a result of substantially 
better remedies, patentees were eager to bring actions in equity.254 
But even if the possible award was substantial, receiving a 
monetary award in equity was impracticable. Accounting was 
extremely time consuming and often contentious, resulting in 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
254 Hilton Davis Chem. Co. v. Warner-Jenkinson Co., 62 F.3d 1512, 1567 (Fed. 
Cir. 1995), rev’d, 520 U.S. 17 (1997) (Nies, J., dissenting) (noting that there 
were virtually no jury cases in patent law after the 1870 amendment). 
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litigation for damages long after the initial suit—a substantial 
delay of justice. In 1946, accounting procedures were scratched, 
but patentees are now offered reasonable royalties as the measure 
of minimum recovery. 
V. REASONABLE ROYALTIES AND ONGOING ROYALTIES 
A. The History of Reasonable Royalties 
Courts increasingly tried to avoid awarding nominal damages 
in patent suits and instead began to award a reasonable royalty for 
the past use of the patented invention. The reasonable royalty is 
markedly different from other legal remedies in that precision is no 
longer required for this damage to be awarded. It is by far the most 
prevalent award today.255  
Perhaps the first use of the reasonable royalty was in the case 
of Hayden v. Suffolk Mfg. Co.256 The district court instructed that 
the jury could consider an amount based on a license to a third 
party and the value that the defendant had derived from use of the 
invention.257 The Supreme Court affirmed, stating, “There being 
no established patent or license fee in the case, in order to get at a 
fair measure of damages, or even an approximation to it, general 
evidence must necessarily be resorted to.”258  
Coupe v. Royer went in a different direction.259 While 
recognizing that district courts have been inconsistent in the 
application of damage rules, the Supreme Court held that damage 
calculations could not be guesswork.260 The case involved a 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
255 See Chris Barry et. al. 2011 Patent Litigation Study: Patent Litigation Trends 
As The "America Invents Act" Becomes Law, PRICEWATERHOUSECOOPERS, at 14 
(2011), available at http://www.aipla.org/resources2/intlip/Documents/Other-
International-Events/US-Bar-JPO-Liaison-Council-2012/2011-patent-litigation-
study.pdf. 
256 11 F. Cas. 900 (C.C.D. Mass. 1862). 
257 Id. at 907. 
258 Suffolk Mfg. Co. v. Hayden, 70 U.S. (3 Wall.) 315, 319 (1866). 
259 155 U.S. 565 (1895). 
260 Id. at 581–83. 
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machine that supposedly improved the quality of leather.261 The 
defendants argued that the machine was useless.262 While the 
plaintiff testified that the invention increased the price of the hide 
by three or four dollars, he conceded that the jury should only 
award one dollar per hide.263 The jury agreed and accepted the 
estimation by the plaintiff of the cost.264 The Supreme Court 
reversed, suggesting that the plaintiff must show what the 
defendant had gained before it could be used as indirect 
evidence.265  
Courts would later distinguish these two cases. While it is true 
that the plaintiff in Hayden, unlike the plaintiff in Coupe, had more 
proof of the actual value of the patented invention, recall that a 
single license “does not tend to establish”266 the value of a patent; 
the rule set by Rude v. Wescott in 1889267 should have effectively 
overturned Hayden.  
However, the law has moved away from Rude and Coupe. The 
Supreme Court in the 1915 decision Dowagiac Mfg. Co. v. Minn. 
Moline Plow Co.268 changed the momentum, permanently, in favor 
of a reasonable royalty. The Court changed its approach, treating 
infringement as a tort on property interests269 rather than a breach 
of contract, therefore allowing more flexibility.270 Likewise, two 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
261 Royer v. Coupe, 29 F. 358, 368 (C.C.D. Mass. 1886), rev’d, Coupe v. Royer, 
155 U.S. 565 (1895). 
262 Id. at 372. 
263 Id. at 371. 
264 Id. at 360 (syllabus of the court).  
265 Coupe v. Royer, 155 U.S. 565, 583 (1895). 
266 See text accompanying note 123. 
267 130 U.S. 152, 167 (1889) (damages must be shown by “clear and definitive 
proof.”).  
268 235 U.S. 641 (1915). 
269 Id. at 648. 
270 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 912 cmt. c (1979) (noting that 
expert estimations on the value of land can be “far from certain”); see also John 
C. Jarosz & Michael J. Chapman, The Hypothetical Negotiation and Reasonable 
Royalty Damages: The Tail Wagging the Dog, 16 STAN. TECH. L. REV. 769, 786 
(2013) (“[R]easonable royalty damages are a form of general damages intended 
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preceding cases from the circuit courts, both cited in Dowagiac,271 
characterized infringement as tortious conduct.272 Despite 
Dowagiac’s attempt to say that reasonable royalties were 
consistent with precedent,273 this case marked a fundamental shift 
from how patent damages were approached just twenty years 
earlier.274 
Congress tried to codify this change in 1922, amending the 
statute to provide that “reasonable compensation” would be 
awarded, with the assistance of experts, in cases where damages 
could not be determined with “reasonable certainty.”275 The major 
issue with the 1922 act is that reasonable royalties were available 
only in actions of equity, not law, which meant that accounting 
was still necessary.276 The error was reversed in 1946, when the 
patent statute was amended to state that patentees were entitled “at 
least to a reasonable royalty,” eliminating nominal damages.277 
Reasonable royalties are still the floor today.278 
The modern application of reasonable royalties is a hotly 
debated topic.279 To review briefly, a court uses a legal fiction. To 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
to compensate for the tort of patent infringement. They are not, and were not 
intended to be, a form of contract damages, retroactive or otherwise.”). 
271 Dowagiac, 235 U.S. at 650. 
272 Bemis Car Box Co. v. J G Brill Co, 200 F. 749, 754 (3d Cir. 1912); U.S. 
Frumentum Co. v. Lauhoff, 216 F. 610, 615 (1914). 
273 See Dowagiac, 235 U.S. at 648. 
274 Recall that Justice Story explicitly stated that infringement was not a tort. 
Whittemore v. Cutter, 29 F. Cas. 1123, 1125 (C.C.D. Mass. 1813) (No. 17,601). 
275 Act of February 18, 1922, Pub. L. No. 147, ch. 58, 42 Stat. 389, 393 § 8. 
276 Id.; see Tassinari, supra note 245, at 57 (“When the court enters a decree 
finding infringement, the practice is to . . . take an accounting . . . .”). 
277 Act of August 1, 1946, 79 Pub. L. 587, ch. 726, 60 Stat. 778. 
278 35 U.S.C. § 284 (2012). 
279 See, e.g., Mark. A. Glick, The Law and Economics of Patent Infringement 
Damages, 10 UTAH B.J. 11, 15 (1997) (“One of the most confusing areas of 
patent damage law is the calculation of a reasonable royalty.”); Jarosz & 
Chapman, supra note 270; Layne S. Keele, “ResQ”ing Patent Infringement 
Damages after ResQNet: The Dangers of Litigation Licenses as Evidence of a 
Reasonable Royalty, 20 TEX. INTELL. PROP. L.J. 181 (2012). 
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determine the reasonable royalty, the court must imagine the 
parties are willing partners negotiating a royalty.280 Expert 
testimony is accepted, concentrating on the so-called Georgia-
Pacific factors.281 The fifteen factors were not meant to be an 
exhaustive list,282 but nevertheless, many courts have used them to 
determine the royalty.283 The factors are a mix of the same 
considerations that are used to determine established royalties, lost 
profits, and accounting.284 The method has been sharply criticized, 
with critics mostly agreeing that royalties have been estimated too 
high in light of the entire market value rule, which states that a 
patentee is entitled to the entire profit of an infringing product if 
the patented improvement drove the market of the product.285 
It is important to note, however, the nature and rationale of 
reasonable royalty. Precision was the controlling concern in the 
19th century. Reasonableness, not precision, is the controlling 
concern today. Despite valiant efforts in economic models to bring 
precision to the calculation of reasonable royalties,286 there is no 
reconciliation between the principles of reasonableness and 
precision.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
280 CHISUM, supra note 64, § 20.07[1]. 
281 See Georgia-Pacific Corp. v. U.S. Plywood Corp., 318 F. Supp. 1116, 1120 
(S.D.N.Y. 1970). 
282 Id. 
283 CHISUM, supra note 64, § 20.07[1][d]. 
284 For example, royalties received by the patentees (the first factor) are viewed 
much like established royalties, except established royalties would not consider 
license agreements settled under threat of litigation. Georgia-Pacific, 318 F. 
Supp. at 1120; see generally Keele, supra note 279 (discussing the dangers of 
using settlements in calculation of a reasonable royalty). The attempt by the 
patentee to keep a close monopoly (factor three) is considered just as in lost 
profits. Georgia-Pacific, 318 F. Supp. at 1120. 
285 See, e.g., Lemley, supra note 156, at 659.  
286 See, e.g., Thomas F. Cotter, Four Principles for Calculating Reasonable 
Royalties in Patent Infringement Litigation, 27 SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & 
HIGH TECH. L.J. 725 (2011). 
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B. The (Short) History of Ongoing Royalties 
In 2006, eBay v. MercExchange ,287  overturned the old rule of 
granting permanent injunctions as a matter of course. Naturally, 
some successful patent litigants will find it more difficult to obtain 
injunctions. In those situations, what remedies are available if an 
injunction is denied? 
The Federal Circuit has held that a district court may award 
ongoing royalties.288 The court defined ongoing royalties as, “a 
reasonable royalty in light of the ongoing infringement.”289 For 
authority, the court relied on a previous 1985 Federal Circuit 
case290 and a 1973 Supreme Court case that stated ongoing 
royalties are “well-established forms of relief when necessary to an 
effective remedy, particularly where patents have provided the 
leverage for . . . antitrust violation adjudication.”291 This is thin 
support, especially the use of the Supreme Court case, because 
there the United States had express statutory authority for an 
ongoing royalty.292  
Ongoing royalties are a form of equitable relief, as legal 
damages are confined to harm actually inflicted.293 Because the 
award of ongoing royalties was not practiced in England before 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
287 547 U.S. 388, 390 (2006). 
288 Paice L.L.C. v. Toyota Motor Corp., 504 F.3d 1293, 1314–15 (Fed. Cir. 
2014). 
289 Id. at 1315. 
290 Shatterproof Glass Corp. v. Libbey-Owens Ford. Co., 758 F.2d 613, 628 
(Fed. Cir. 1985).  
291 United States v. Glaxo Group Ltd., 410 U.S. 52, 93 (1973). 
292 See 15 U.S.C. § 4 (2012) (United States attorneys have duty to institute 
proceedings in equity antitrust cases, and may “bring forth the case and praying 
the case and praying that such violation shall be enjoined or otherwise 
prohibited”) (emphasis added). 
293 See Paice, 504 F.3d at 1313 n.13, 1314; Bos. Sci. Corp. v. Johnson & 
Johnson, No. C 02-0790 SI, 2009 WL 975424, at *5 (N.D. Cal. April 9, 2009); 
Whittemore v. Cutter, 29 F. Cas. 1123, 1125 (C.C.D. Mass. 1813) (No. 17,601) 
(damages are what the plaintiff had in fact sustained, that is, no prospective 
damages); ROBINSON, supra note 17, § 1088. 
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1789,294 Congress must either expressly or implicitly allow courts 
to award ongoing royalties.295  Scholarly articles have debated 
whether courts have the authority to issue ongoing royalties.296 On 
one hand, the sections for remedies in preceding patent statutes 
have increasingly allowed legal damages during equitable 
proceedings,297 which might indicate that all equitable remedies 
should be available to fully compensate the patentee.298 However, 
it is arguable that subsequent changes to the statute purposely 
avoided compulsory licenses (that is, government-forced ongoing 
royalties).299 It is a question that the Supreme Court may need to 
answer in the near future, though some justices on the Court have 
hinted at rejecting a court’s ability to issue ongoing royalties.300  
Assuming, arguendo, that courts have the power to issue 
ongoing royalties under the theory of equity, the question of how 
to determine that royalty remains.301 In light of the history of 
preliminary and permanent injunctions, it is important to remember 
that ongoing royalties serve an equitable purpose. Therefore, the 
four-factor test historically employed by courts of equity should be 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
294 See Gómez-Arostegui, supra note 190, at 1699–1708 (concluding there was 
no such equity practice in England). 
295 Id. at 1685. 
296 See, e.g., id. at 1661 (arguing courts lack authority). Contra Mark A. Lemley, 
The Ongoing Confusion Over Ongoing Royalties, 76 MO. L. REV. 695, 697 
(2011) (arguing courts have authority). 
297 See Patent Act of 1870, ch. 230, 16 Stat. 198-217, § 55; Act of February 18, 
1922, Pub. L. No. 147, ch. 58, 42 Stat. 389, 393 § 8. 
298 See 35 U.S.C. § 284 (2012). 
299 See Gómez-Arostegui, supra note 190, at 1724 (“[I]t is impossible to argue 
that Congress contemplated and incorporated a judicially imposed compulsory 
license . . . .”). 
300 See eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 547 U.S. 388, 396 (2006) (Kennedy, 
J., concurring) (“When the patented invention is but a small component of the 
product the companies seek to produce and the threat of an injunction is 
employed simply for undue leverage in negotiations, legal damages may well be 
sufficient to compensate for the infringement . . . .”). 
301 The Federal Circuit currently holds that there is no right to jury for this 
equitable remedy. Paice L.L.C. v. Toyota Motor Corp., 504 F.3d 1293, 1315-16 
(Fed. Cir. 2007).  
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applied to ongoing royalties,302 and courts should refrain from 
considering the same factors that were used to determine past 
damages.303  
If courts do not have the power to issue ongoing royalties, 
courts may still compensate patentees by enhancing damages by 
way of the treble provision.304 The purpose of the treble damages 
provision was to provide adequate remedies to those who do not 
have access to equity.305 District courts could simply use this 
provision to compensate patentees if district courts were given 
more discretion to access treble damages than is currently 
permitted by the Federal Circuit. 
But is also important to remember why plaintiffs are seeking 
ongoing royalties in the first place. It is because the patentee was 
denied a permanent injunction. Since eBay, permanent injunctions 
have usually been denied to non-practicing entities (“NPEs”).306 
NPEs are extremely controversial. Much debate has surrounded 
reforming the patent code to prevent some of the entities, 
derisively called “patent trolls,” from coercing license agreements 
by threatening litigation.307 In light of the history recounted in this 
article, the solution to these NPEs might be found without reform. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
302 See eBay v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 547 U.S. 388, 391 (2006). 
303 Contra Lemley, supra note 156, at 702–3 (arguing that reasonable royalties 
should be used to determine ongoing royalties, and stating, “[c]uriously . . . 
Federal Circuit panels addressing the issue seem to believe that the question is 
entirely different from the issue of past damages.”). But see ROBINSON, supra 
note 18, § 1050 (“The principles adopted in the courts of equity cannot be 
imported into the courts of law, or those into equity, without serious confusion 
and inevitable mistake . . . . It is . . . of primary importance that in discussing 
damages at law, or profits and damages in equity, each topic should be kept free 
form the special doctrines appertaining to the other . . . .”) (emphasis added). 
304 35 U.S.C. § 284 (2012). 
305 Supra Part III.B.1. 
306 Andrew Beckerman-Rodau, The Aftermath of eBay v. MercExchange, 89 J. 
PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SOC’Y, 631, 632-33 (2007). 
307 See generally Colleen V. Chien, Of Trolls, Davids, Goliaths, and Kings, 87 
N.C. L. REV. 1571 (2009). 
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Before 1946, NPEs could not recover enhanced damages.308 
Furthermore, these speculators were not likely to prove actual 
harm during litigation because they did not choose to enjoy the 
monopoly.309 Courts simply award the statutory minimum and 
refuse to grant enhanced damages (which is consistent with 
history) and refuse ongoing royalties (because those who do not act 
equitably receive none) if the district court feels that the NPE has 
acted contrary to the purpose of the patent system. With only a 
reasonable royalty available, bad-behaving NPEs (“trolls”) could 
not use litigation to coerce licenses. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
Calculation of damages and equity are persistently difficult in 
every area of the law.310 Accordingly, the history presented here 
shows that remedies have been inconsistent. This inconsistency in 
patent remedies reflects competing policy interests. For example, 
businesses that have worked, developed, and depended on their 
patents deserve protection. However, speculators do not invoke 
sympathy when they indiscriminately threaten infringement suits. 
Granting both the same royalty does little to advance policy goals.  
History may be an invaluable guide on how to effectuate 
desired policy goals. Juries should determine the award that it 
believes would fully compensate the patentee. If such award is too 
small given the facts of the case, district courts should use their 
discretion to increase damages pursuant to the patent statute. 
Equity (injunctions and ongoing royalties) should be granted to 
those who practice their patents equitably. Such practices would be 
consistent with history and provide much needed flexibility in 
patent enforcement.  
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
308 ROBINSON, supra note 18, § 1069. 
309 See id. § 1062. 
310 11-55 CORBIN ON CONTRACTS § 55.1 (“The law of remedies has probably 
always involved a greater degree of uncertainty than has the system of rules by 
which rights and duties are determined.”). 
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